



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*; *Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Le hasard chez Aristote et chez Cournot. G. MILHAUD. *Rev. de Mét.*, X, 6, pp. 667–681.

There is no great difference between the views of Aristotle and of Cournot. They agree that everything has a cause, and that chance is not the absence of cause. For Cournot, chance is the result of the combination of events which belong to different series of causes. For Aristotle, chance is the relation between terms that are taken as the limits of series, either by nature or by the human will. It is closely associated with accident, in the sense of not normal. Accident is what attaches to one series, but belongs to another, or, rather, to none at all. Accident cannot be the object of science, because it is neither permanent nor frequent. Science must proceed by demonstration. Cournot says: It is not because the examples are rare or surprising that we should call them the results of chance. This statement, however, is not intended to deny the rarity of the fortuitous event, but is directed against the tendency to speak of chance in the presence of a curious fact. Frequency of the event is the reason for rejecting chance and explaining facts by one permanent cause. With Aristotle, the accidental or fortuitous attaches to the material element, while the actuality of certain determinations is effected by the formal element. With Cournot, chance attaches to the idea of complete contingency and disappears in so far as the reason of things becomes manifest. While the former separates chance and science, the latter makes a fundamental distinction between the historical 'given' and the scientific element. The notion of chance has its foundation in nature and is not relative to human ignorance. The facts excluded from science are historical results, which are irreducible to a rational order, *e. g.*, the 'given' which philology accepts as the material on which it establishes the laws of word-formation. The important difference between ancient and modern science is not in regard to necessity and contingency, but in regard to scientific certainty. For Aristotle, the mind attains to eternal truth; for Cournot, reason is a light to guide us according to the greatest probability.

N. E. TRUMAN.

Essai sur le hasard. HENRI PIERON. Rev. de Mét., X, 6, pp. 682-695.

In the popular consciousness of the Greeks, $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\chi\eta$ was associated with events which could not be foreseen ; it was separated from the idea of finality. In the modern consciousness, as a result of the anthropomorphic tendency, chance is connected with a certain capricious purposiveness. In philosophy there is an inverse development. Aristotle attributed to chance a certain finality, one end was substituted for another, by reason of the resistance which matter offered to form. With Cournot, the notion of finality has entirely disappeared ; chance is the result of the union of two or more causal series. Even here, however, the contingency would not be absolute ; for a mind that could synthesize the series in advance, there would be nothing fortuitous. Cournot's definition is inadequate because it lacks a subjective element. When we speak of chance in relation to other things, it is with a reference to ourselves. The definitions of Cournot and of Aristotle are not opposed, but mutually supplementary. To constitute chance there must be an event resulting from the union of series and unpredictable analytically, an event so interesting that the mind establishes it from efficient causes, though it appears to consist in final causes. In the calculus of chances, we have an absolutely new concept. The only common element is a certain degree of ignorance. Here, however, the ignorance is inability to foresee the event, though we can determine the causes more or less scientifically. Chance is a universally regulative principle, a tendency to equilibrium.

N. E. TRUMAN.

The Concept of the Infinite. JOSIAH ROYCE. Hibbert Journal, I, 1, pp. 21-45.

Two questions arise in connection with a study of the Infinite. The one is purely logical : What do we mean by the concept of the infinite ? The other is a metaphysical question : What grounds have we, if we have any grounds, for asserting that the real universe, whether divine or material, whether spatial or temporal, is infinite ? Professor Royce deals with the first of these rather than with the second, merely touching its application to God and the universe. It is common in trade-marks to have represented on the whole article a picture of itself true in all details. This picture logically would include another picture like the first, and so on *ad infinitum*. This Professor Royce calls the plan of "Self-representation." To exactly define it, let us say first : it is the formal conception of a perfect pictorial representation of an object ; and secondly, the picture shall be contained in, or laid upon, the object that is pictured, and form a part thereof. This plan, however, would be practically impossible.

Taking, again, the perfectly definite series of whole numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . . ∞ , and writing under it the series of even numbers, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, . . . ∞ , we find in either series no last term ; for every term ' n ' in the upper we have ' $2n$ ' in the lower, so the lower series would form, as a possible fact, a precise picture of the upper, and be just as rich. Then,

too, in the integral powers of 2, for example, $2^1, 2^2, 2^3, 2^4, 2^5, \dots \infty$, we have a more striking example. The series of 2 is infinite, for there is a power to correspond to every whole number. Yet the powers of 2 form a very small part of infinity, since we have left out of account the powers of the prime numbers 3, 5, 7, etc., which are whole numbers. And yet, "that part of the whole numbers which consists of the powers of 2 has a separate member to correspond to every single whole number, that is, the part is as rich as the whole." With a view to this, Dedekind defines a collection as infinite, if it can be put in "one to one correspondence, or can thus be found equal to one of its own parts."

Now this is not paradoxical; it holds true for infinite quantities only. In self-consciousness, let us take for example a thought S , and represent the thought ' S is one of my thoughts' by S' . For every thought S , then, we can have a thought S' . Now the series of reflective thoughts S' is a part and *not* the whole of possible thoughts, for we may have mere thoughts. So a part may be equal to the whole, but not necessarily *all* parts. However, there are different 'Dignities' of the Infinite, that is, where a one to one correspondence is impossible between whole and part. For instance, the collection of all the possible fractions, rational and irrational, between 0 and 1 is one of a higher dignity than the collection of whole numbers, and there is an endless series of these dignities. Now this conception that a part can, in infinities of equal dignities, be equal to the whole, throws light on the relation of the individual to God. A being as one of the infinite number of parts within the universe, that is, the divine whole, might justly count it not robbery to be equal to God, if he only receives somewhere an infinite expression, by virtue of perfected self-attainment.

R. B. WAUGH.

Le principe de raison suffisante en logique et en métaphysique. G. SIMONS.

Rev. Néo-Scholastique, IX, 3, pp. 298-325.

In Leibniz's statements: 'Nothing ever happens without a cause, or, at least, a determining reason . . . ; or, further, nothing ever happens such that it would be impossible for one who knew the things well enough to give a reason which would determine why it is thus and not otherwise,' he has failed to distinguish between the logical and the metaphysical use of the principle of reason. His rationalism predisposed him to recognize only *a priori* deductive demonstration and ontological reasons. What is the meaning of logical and ontological principles? A principle which exerts any influence on the nature or existence of a thing is an ontological principle; one from which knowledge arises is a principle of knowledge. The analysis of mediate knowledge discovers: First, the purely formal subordination of less general to more general formulæ; and, secondly, the fact that its content arises from the development of immediate knowledge. The first is logical, the second ontological. That which aids in the logical development of knowledge is a principle of knowledge, and

therefore subjective. On the other hand, that which furnishes the content of mediate knowledge likewise contributes to knowledge, but it also reaches the foundation of that knowledge and is objective. Is the human mind constructive or merely reproductive? The scholastics distinguished between intelligence and reason, according as it reached its object directly or indirectly. The human mind reaches its object indirectly. It cannot perceive at a single glance a complex object, but only simple indecomposable ones. The essence of an object, though a unity, requires a multiplicity of acts to be comprehended. It is here that reason comes in to restore the objective unity to these elements. The law in virtue of which the mind is able to reduce multiplicity to unity, is the principle of reason. Since every coördination is a reduction to more general knowledge, and presupposes a common basis of unification, we can say every complex object has a reason. In the synthetic order, we presuppose the complex object, and reason reconstitutes the object which our feeble intelligences decomposed. In the analytic order, the mind is constructive with the simple elements. Psychologically speaking, the principle of reason is a need of explaining everything, an intellectual curiosity, the conviction that all knowledge can be reduced to knowledge more general. Analysis shows that this arises from reflection. Logic is the science of the purely formal connection of concepts. To say here 'All knowledge has a basis,' is to say: 'All mediate knowledge has a subjective motive determining the union of the terms which express it.' This motive is the third or middle term. There are, besides, habits of combination which are also bases of our thought. Metaphysically speaking, the principle of reason states: Every object of knowledge has a basis. Essences, though unities in themselves, require a multiplicity of acts of thought. These partial perceptions have their objectivity and intelligibility, and from this results the synthesis. This basis is objective. Without this basis the object could not be comprehended nor be an object of such a nature. As every essence is manifested as a complex object, the principle of reason is objective and metaphysical. Whether the reasons by which we synthesize be subjective or real, they always belong to the very nature of the object and are metaphysical. Ontological reasons and objective causes may serve as middle terms in logic, and in this manner the logical and metaphysical points of view may be correlated. O. G. SHUMARD.

Feeling and Self-Awareness. G. A. TAWNEY. Psych. Rev., IX, 6, pp. 570-596.

Feeling and thought are often opposed to each other on the ground that the former refers to a subject and the latter to an object. This distinction, however, is not absolute; since, in normal experience, feeling is sometimes attributed to objects, as it habitually is in religious mysticism and under certain pathological conditions. A genetic *differentia* of feeling and thought is attempted in the theory of the 'relative priority of feeling.' T. argues

against this view: (1) If feelings are prior, it ought to be possible to say what feeling comes first; but this cannot be done. Also, there is no reason to regard primitive consciousness as feeling more than as awareness or as motor tendency; but, more probably, primitive consciousness consists both of feeling and awareness indistinguishably fused, which, however, are differentiated by movements. (2) The development of the nervous system, presumably necessary to the existence of feeling, would not bear out the theory of the prior origin of feelings. Feeling always refers to a self; but, in the early stages of development, to an object as well as to a self. Hence, the law that implicitly at first, and explicitly later, 'feeling is always an attributive element in the consciousness of self.' This reference to the self accounts for the uniqueness of feelings, as it also accounts for the uniqueness of objects felt. The feeling of self arises in organic and other special sensations; but adjustments to objects, self-interest, imitation, and language all contribute to the growth of self. Self-consciousness develops from the relations of oneself to other selves. T. distinguishes two types of self-consciousness. One is derived from the empirical qualities of the body (organic sensations, etc.) and the sense of the difference of the body from all other objects; the other, reflective self-consciousness, is derived from social relations with other selves. The feelings of the latter type acquire a universality which expresses itself in æsthetic and ethics; the feelings of the former type remain individual and peculiar.

H. C. STEVENS.

A Biological View of Perception. THADDEUS L. BOLTON. Psych. Rev., IX, 6, pp. 537-549.

Perception is usually defined as a complex of sensations, which stands for an object. This view regards perception as purely passive. But there is in perception another element which is frequently overlooked, viz., the element contributed by the organism itself—the reaction to the stimulus. This view regards perception as active. On the first view, emphasis is put upon the presentation, the stimulus; on the second view, stress is laid on the representation, the reaction. Biological evidence is cited in the case of the behavior of chicks and frogs to stimuli. For example, the chick sees a moving particle and pecks at it; its perception does not consist in the visual stimulus of the moving particle merely, but in the visual stimulus *plus* its reaction to the stimulus—pecking. The frog's perception of a piece of red flannel does not consist simply in color sensations, for it might have sensations of color from other objects; but the total perception consists in seeing and swallowing the flannel. The manner of reacting becomes less definite in conscious beings; but, nevertheless, perception has these two sides—the presentative and representative, or, more technically, the stimulus and the reaction.

H. C. STEVENS.

Le vocabulaire et l'idéation. A. BINET. Rev. Ph., XXVII, 10, pp. 359-367.

This article describes some experiments to show the relation between the general trend of consciousness and vocabulary. The observers were two sisters: Marguerite, fifteen years old, and Armande, fourteen. M. is described as belonging to the observant type; her thought is precise, attentive, and practical. A. belongs to the imaginative type; her thought is more vague, more disconnected, and more poetic. Both girls had lived under the same conditions and had had the same education. They were subjected to the same mental tests. In one case, they were asked to describe the leaf of a chestnut tree. M. gave a minute, botanical description of the leaf. A. gave first place to her emotions excited by the dead leaf of autumn and second place to the description of the leaf. They were also asked to write a list of 350 words. B. notes three differences in the vocabularies. M. wrote common nouns, as she was requested to do, while A. wrote some verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. M. did not write as many abstract words as her sister. M. wrote fewer choice words than A. The conclusion is that the vocabulary agrees with the nature of the intellectual type.

H. C. STEVENS.

ETHICS AND ÆSTHETICS.

La responsabilité. CH. DUNAN. Rev. de Mét., X, 4, pp. 422-436.

Reason, human or divine, is not only the law, but the judge of conduct. To it moral beings are, as such, responsible. This implies that man is the free author of his acts. Otherwise the responsibility would belong to the cause moving him. The only alternatives are, accordingly, the absolutism of rational man, or the meaningless character of 'moral responsibility.' Now reason is essentially autonomous, and only pure materialism denies that man is a life principle, which is all that absolutism means. But responsibility demands the power of reflection, and this is phenomenally conditioned. Hence only the noumenal will is truly responsible. This is Kant's doctrine, and is, with two important changes, indubitable. The noumenal will (1) penetrates the phenomenal by introducing an element of contingency, and (2) is thereby changed. Unless it be modifiable, it remains a mere irrational spontaneity. As a third condition of responsibility, free will is sometimes added. But the power of existing for and through self is already implied in the reflection of an absolute being. And free will, in the sense of liberty or sovereign reason, is impossible; for, though absolute, we are not reason itself. This idealistic account of causality does not contradict the empirical. Lombroso's statement that innate tendencies are inherited and that acquired ones result from external circumstances, in no wise invalidates responsibility. Our non-temporal wills determine each other for good or evil actions in time and space. Yet, since one will can accomplish nothing unless all consent, every man is in part the author of nature, and so is accountable for all that is. Thus, responsibility remains

individual, *is* individuality and nothing else. Although undeniable, the doctrine of free agency cannot be made the basis of civil law. The inviolability of the human person conflicts with the right of the state to punish. But the state's one interest is self-preservation, and this is impossible without legal obligation and sanction. The existence of society does not, however, necessitate absolute justice, but what is just. Accordingly, human law is concerned with the maintenance of public safety rather than with the inculcation of morality. Punishment is not intended as an expiation of guilt, but is considered sufficient as soon as efficient. That is, the problem of modern law deals with man's social, not his transcendental, responsibility.

A. D. MONTGOMERY.

Le besoin de prier et ses conditions psychologiques. F. DA COSTA GUIMARAENS. Rev. Ph., XXVII, 10, pp. 391-412.

Prayer is a fundamental need of the human organism and has evolved with it. Broadly considered, it is manifested in the ordinary as well as in the religious life, the only difference consisting in the being to whom it is addressed and the affective changes thus brought about. One is not astonished, then, to find that it has as its most general characteristics, universality and relativity. It is universal in the sense that, in some form or degree, it is common to every human being, and to the higher animals as well, more especially the domestic species. It is relative in the sense that its affective antecedents are conditioned by many and varied complex factors, the principal of which seem to be: the individual and his temperament, age, sex, race, circumstances, education, habit, historical epoch, time, and place. Consistent with this feature of relativity, we find that the need is occasional, periodic, intermittent, and that it can be acquired, with proper attention to the inducing conditions. Like other organic predispositions, the tendency is unquestionably hereditary, although environment is a strongly modifying factor. The remainder of the article is given up to the discussion of its attendant physiological and psychological phenomena, its nature, its cause and effects, and its pathology, the principal conclusions from which seem to be that the need is fundamental, physiological; that it is '*un cri du corps*' as well as '*un cri de l'âme*,' the manifestation of a general appeal on the part of the organism. Prayer satisfies a certain demand for exercise of our faculties; it is a constituent element of man, inseparable from human nature, in a way an emotional vent, the normal use of which is necessary to the mental and physical poise and well being. There are peculiar moods and states of the organism for which it is as essentially the natural expression and relief as is the shedding of tears, or laughter, for others, and its repression leaves a distinct pathological tracing, while its exercise strengthens and stimulates. In short, it is egoistic, practical, utilitarian, a part of the instinct of self-preservation.

C. E. FERREE.

La confusion entre l'ordre social et l'ordre religieux. E. RÉCÉJAC.
Rev. Ph., XXIX, 9, pp. 217-242.

The origin of the religious order is not really contemporaneous and parallel with that of the social order, but is to be found in an unique mystical concept in human consciousness, viz., the idea of 'grace.' This concept is the foundation of Christianity, and our study will bear upon four points: (1) the mystical impression and social expression of 'grace,' (2) the basis of the 'mystical city,' (3) 'grace' and 'right,' (4) the civil effects of excommunication. (1) To get at the psychological basis of faith, let us look at history. The two main characteristics of Christ were, first, His feeling of oneness with God, and, secondly, His belief that this union was attainable by all. This expansive tendency is necessary for the existence of the church; hence arises 'grace,' as the inner feeling of oneness with God and election by God. This mystical impression cannot find social expression in language, so the sacraments originated as a social institution. These rites are a middle expression between language and the mystical vision which cannot be expressed by language. (2) Christ's dream of a purely mystical church could not be realized; instead we have a church both religious and political, which has had to adapt itself to society. According to St. Augustine, the mystic city was the union of those souls that had '*amor dei*' as opposed to '*amor sui*.' This 'grace,' or '*amor dei*,' arises from God and not through ourselves. How, then, is a man irreligious, if he does not love God? Rather, God refuses to love him. '*Amor dei*' does not imply the perfect denial of self; by this one rather realizes oneself. The love of self and the love of God are inseparably connected. (3) Christ omitted two things, in founding his church, which were necessary for its existence, viz., hierarchy and the right to hold property. Hence a quarrel arose in the fourteenth century between the mystic church, adhering to Christ's principles, and the clerical church, claiming the right of rank in the priesthood and the right to hold property. The church only saved itself by the prestige of the sacraments and the papal bull of John XXII., which declared that Christ did not refuse the right to use property, but merely the right to own it. All right belongs to God. The idea of right is of modern growth. Among the Romans, right was legal, now it is of the person. Divine right has been idealized by the church and rendered inviolable. It is the foundation of modern society, while 'grace' is not. (4) The idea of 'election,' like that of 'exclusiveness,' has received the condemnation of those who have not this saving power of 'grace.' The very saving of some souls implies the loss of others. The church could not exist unless it assumed this unique power of salvation. Excommunication is only an eliminating principle of the '*société spirituelle*' in so far as it hopes to reach the civil life of the very people whom it has excluded. To the old terrors of damnation, however, has succeeded the hesitation to incur human disrespect. We must recognize the two sides of 'grace': (1) the purely mystical phase, a striving for egoistic perfection; and (2)

the expansive side, which promotes the social order. True religion consists in the latter.

R. B. WAUGH.

The Practical Consciousness of Freedom. R. B. PERRY. Int. J. E., XIII, 1, pp. 40-55.

In spite of the many apparently overwhelming defeats which indeterminism has met with, no theory has been so little disturbed or forced itself more perversely upon the attention. Evidently there must be some profound practical need of mankind which this 'theoretical monstrosity' satisfies. Kant recognized this, when he called freedom a postulate, along with God and immortality, and found their roots in the moral nature of man. It is, accordingly, the common moral consciousness, rather than metaphysics or even ethics, which must be considered in order to see what is meant and what is gained by this postulate of freedom. Every moral being apprehends, however vaguely, a certain set of *ideals*, the *duty* which these impose upon him, and thereby his *responsibility*. These terms signify to most men the heart of conduct. Now what is meant by saying that freedom denotes a practical experience and a moral value inseparable from this conception of life? In the first place, moral loyalty demands that God be acquitted of designing a universe in which sin is inevitable. Freedom implies alternatives—the evil *might* have been avoided. Moral courage dwells only in a world of possibilities; out of the consciousness of liberty issues the will to achieve. The proof of determinism would not affect the moral ideal, but it would destroy individual initiative. The statement that a belief in freedom *ought* to make no difference, that free or not man ought to do his duty, simply begs the question, since it assumes the continuance of the sense of duty. Again, it is said that a deterministic theory is morally beneficial, because it emphasizes the connection between character and conduct, on the one hand, and conduct and external events, on the other. But the truth of determinism could only be practically beneficial by arousing in some individual the will to make use of it; and then the will to achieve it would belie its content. Turn now to metaphysics to see what provision is made for man's abiding sense of liberty. Consciousness of freedom presupposes that under identical conditions several events are possible; a succession of moments is implied, the second of which is not implicitly contained in the first. Obviously, such a conception is diametrically opposed to mechanism, which considers all the facts of the universe as members of a causal series, each state explaining its antecedents and implying its consequents. But the consciousness of freedom is equally opposed to the super-temporal determinism of idealism, which claims that the universe is some nature that is out of time, having a fixed character *sub specie aeternitatis*. Whether or not the facts of the temporal sequence are mutually determined, their occurrence is prescribed by the character of the whole, of which they are necessary constituents. But the nature of the whole is an ultimate matter of fact, not open to question. Since it cannot

be said that anything determined the universe as a whole to be what it is, therefore, it is argued, the universe is self-determined or free. But this involves a palpable *non sequitur*—choice, and so freedom, may be entirely excluded. What can it mean to say that existence in general is free to exist or not to exist? If it is free, it must exist to be free, and hence cannot be free not to exist. The universe must exist in order to be free, and, its character being immutable, this very existence denies its freedom. The thesis proposed is accordingly this: *The practical consciousness of freedom implies that the ultimate nature of the universe is subject to temporal change.* It is originally in connection with the temporal series that the question of freedom arises. The moment when an act is chosen is temporal, because it involves a subsequent moment when the selection shall be realized as fact. There must be a moment in which there is a plurality of possibilities, and another in which one of these is actualized and the others have become impossibilities. But real possibility and impossibility rest only on the ultimate structure of the universe; therefore, in the interval between the moment of choice and that of actualization, the ultimate structure of the universe has changed. Thus, a finished universe is incompatible with freedom, which requires a cosmos subject to change. Without temporal change no alternatives, and without alternatives the terms duty and responsibility become meaningless for the common moral consciousness.

A. D. MONTGOMERY.

What is Religion? IRA W. HOWERTH. Int. J. E., XIII, 2, pp. 185–206.

A definition of religion must, first of all, apply to all religions. It must not, again, make religion and belief identical, for beliefs are never permanent. In some religions we find lacking belief in a Supreme Being; in others, belief in immortality. The broadest definition that has been given in terms of belief, makes religion a belief in spiritual beings. This definition goes back to the original of religion, the idea of a double self and nature spirits. If such is the foundation of religion, then, since science has proved these to be erroneous conceptions, religion is left without a support. Ultimately, belief is founded on the perception of a *something*, an infinite, indefinable power. In this conception, belief is one element in religion. A second element is restraint of the individual from acts harmful to the race. But this is not the only element, not the essence of religion, since social restraint does not appear until the social group or its leader becomes conscious of the already existing psychological fact of religion in the individual and finds it valuable as an instrument of restraint. A third element in religion is feeling—the feeling of impotence, of absolute dependence, which we experience before the forces of nature. These three elements may be included in a psychological unity under the name of desire, which implies perception and feeling followed by action. Given the perception of a power manifesting itself in the world and a feeling of dependence upon it, an inevitable result will be the desire of the individual to be in right or

personally advantageous relations to that power. Conscious religious activity is always in obedience to this power. Religion, then, is to be defined as the effective desire to be in right relations to the power manifesting itself in the universe.

C. A. HEBB.

Some Considerations Relating to Human Immortality. J. E. McTAGGART.
Int. J. E., XIII, 2, pp. 152-170.

The object of the present article is to consider some of the arguments against the immortality of the self,—particularly those expressed in the questions: (1) Is my self an activity of my body? (2) Is my present body an essential condition of my self? (3) Is there any reason to suppose that my self does not share the transitory character which I recognize in all the material objects around me? The first of these questions may be answered in the negative. Although the tendency is to regard the self as reducible to terms of matter, as the independent reality, the fact is that our conception of matter consists of: (1) sensations, which are acts of consciousness, not constituents of matter; (2) ideas (*e. g.*, substantiality, causality), which spring from the mind's activity. Matter, therefore, is meaningless apart from spirit, and by itself has no reality. Spirit, therefore, cannot be interpreted in terms of matter; hence, the self cannot be called an activity of the body. For, if my self is one of the activities of my body, then, since my body exists only in the knowledge of some conscious being, my self must be a product of some piece of knowledge, which is absurd. Our second question generally receives an affirmative answer, based on the argument that, since we know no selves to exist without bodies, the self exists by virtue of sensations. But could not the self exist in some body other than the present? We cannot say that it is impossible for a self to think without sense organs and a brain, and to get its data by means other than sensations. The fact that abnormal conditions of the brain affect thought, does not prove that the normal state of the brain is necessary for thought. Finally, ghost stories give us sufficient evidence to justify belief in apparitions of the dead. Apparitions, though they are no proof of immortality, can remove the presumption that the death of the body destroys the self. To answer our third question, Is the self transitory? we must define transitory. Science teaches, not that the constituents of matter (atoms) change, but that only their combinations are transitory. But the self is not a combination. It is a complex whose parts (thoughts, emotions, volitions) cannot be imagined as existing separately. Its form cannot be changed without its content being changed—a conception not analagous to any in science.

C. A. HEBB.

The Evolution of Conscience as a Phase of Sociology. W. L. SHELDON.
American Journal of Sociology, VIII, 3, pp. 360-381.

There is a certain mystery in the appearance and development of conscience. Evolution may explain the growth of sympathy among members

of the same race ; but universal sympathy is not in keeping with the law of the survival of the fittest, and in this respect ethics has in the past yielded too much to evolution. This theory, however, has shown ethics that the moral sense has come by a process of growth, like all other features or phases of mental or spiritual experience. It appears gradually. Moral sense starts in the feelings, and only becomes conscience when the true self-conscious and independent personality appears. Conscience starts under the form of scruples, as may be seen in the savage, when a sense of regret follows certain actions. When the scruple precedes the act and serves as a check, there is a much higher stage in the development of conscience. In the highest stage, when sympathy extends to man as man, there appears a new ideal element, a spiritual law. When man sees conduct in its relations, he is on the verge of a conception of the moral law. The authoritative element in conscience cannot be explained as the 'Voice of God' or as a product of evolution ; it is a product of heredity. When the element of authority has become established, its evolution becomes a story of its growth in the social consciousness. Ancient wars were pursued without justification, but to-day all nations in war plead a just reason. Here can be noted the advance in social consciousness. However, there is yet a lack of conscience in the individual's dealing with corporations. One does not scruple about paying less taxes than one ought ; conscience rather holds between individuals. In the final stage, however, conscience will become more universal, and will apply to all cases. In this last stage of the development of conscience, not merely altruism but egoism in a higher sense will assert itself. A man becomes ashamed, if he has broken a law of his own nature, even unobserved. In its highest form, ethical law is not dealing with social relationships, its one exaction is that each man shall keep his spiritual nature untarnished.

R. B. WAUGH.

Is the Altruist Idea Evolving in Man? A. STODART-WALKER. Westminster Review, CLVIII, 4, pp. 374-381.

Man becomes altruistic as a result of his subjection to a social environment, and as a necessity of self-protection. There is not involved within himself the altruistic idea. Acquired characteristics are not inheritable ; and if they were, there is no evidence to prove an inherited altruism. The child is an egoist by nature, and is only altruistic through the influence of society. The fact that men have not committed murder suggested to them in a hypnotic state, is no proof for inherent altruism. If murder had been suggested as a means of self-protection, the result would have been different. The altruism of the martyrs was rather the product of society than an inheritance. In reply to the objection that conscience and instinct show evidences of the evolution of altruism, the author holds that the conscience has not been proved to exist as a working and intelligent entity apart from the unconsciously absorbed impressions of childhood and apart from accumulated knowledge and experience ; and no altruistic instinct

has been evidenced in childhood before the elementary facts of social consciousness are recognized. Every day we see instances of the ruin of social altruism, and egoistic tendencies arising. As proof of this, the decreasing birthrate among the better class is cited.

R. B. WAUGH.

Die entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtungsweise in der Aesthetik.

JOHANNES VOLKELT. Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn., XXIX, 1, pp. 1-21.

The chief problem of æsthetics consists in the establishment of norms which are valid for the feeling-life of the mature individual of modern times. A universal æsthetics whose norms will be found to be valid for all races and for all ages is an ideal which can only be approximated. An evolutionary æsthetics is subject to a two-fold limitation, for it has to do with stages of the æsthetic evolution not only of the race, but of the individual as well. This complication makes investigation difficult and uncertain. For, not only must we determine what mental processes are present in the mind of the child who is engaged in drawing or in contemplating the artistic productions of others, but we must even go back in time and re-experience the æsthetic feelings of the visitor to the prehistoric temple and of the spectator of the Greek tragedy. If this procedure is possible at all, it is possible only with the aid of a complete race psychology. And the psychological method is essential throughout in æsthetical investigation. It would be of inestimable value to discover the earliest dawn of æsthetic feeling in the race ; but our knowledge of the mental life of primitive man is vague and uncertain. Scherer is of the opinion that poetry has its roots in primitive man's impulse to conversation and amusement. Yet it may be that the songs and dances of the savage are attended only by warlike or sexual or fanatico-religious emotions, and contain no vestige of æsthetic feeling. Lange attempts to supplant the psychological method of æsthetics by an historical or evolutionary method. But Lange's method falls back upon our knowledge of the history of art and of culture ; and our knowledge of these, in their earliest beginnings, at least, is directly proportional to our insight into the psychology of races. Considerations of an evolutionary character must occur in every complete system of æsthetics ; but we cannot speak of an evolutionary basis of æsthetics nor of an evolutionary method in æsthetics.

J. W. BAIRD.